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Abstract 
 This study examines the use of interactive wargaming 
and computer modeling and simulation in assessing the 
overall performance of system of systems (SoS) alternatives 
in conducting critical functions concerning to defeat the 
threat of Maritime Improvised Explosive Devices (MIED) 
in a U.S. port. The geographic area of concern is Puget 
Sound, principally Elliot Bay and Commencement Bay.  
The wargame involves an attack against the Seattle 
Passenger Ferry System and the Maritime Transportation 
System (MTS) using MIEDs.   A unique element of this 
scenario was that it combined an interactive wargame, 
which required crisis management actions, planning and 
coordination, with a series of closed-form simulations.  This 
highlighted both the necessary actions and considerations 
that must be taken by military and civilian leadership in 
order to adequately prepare for and counter MIEDs in U.S. 
Ports, and focused on side-by-side analysis’ of proposed 




 World trade is highly dependent on worldwide 
maritime transportation systems for sustaining the 
expeditious and efficient flow of commerce on the sea.  In 
the U.S., the major hubs for all domestic shipping via 
ground transport originate in major ports such as Seattle, 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and New York.  If any of 
these ports are compromised and the supply stream 
interrupted, the down-stream effects would be felt all along 
routes stemming from these ports.  In 2003, the 
Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development 
(OECD) conducted a study and concluded that a 
coordinated attack on the national MTS would be measured 
in the tens of billions of dollars.1 Should a terrorist 
organization seize on this critical vulnerability and want to 
strike a crippling blow to the US economy, attacking—or 
even feigning an attack on—a major port could prove 
disastrous and is not without merit.   
 Our project team was tasked with designing a system of 
systems that rapidly and efficiently mitigates the effects of a 
MIED attack to the MTS using a procedural-based approach 
known as the Systems Engineering Development Process 
(SEDP).  As part of the SEDP, a modeling and simulation 
effort using Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) 
was designed to perform the following tasks:  1) analysis of 
SoS alternatives, 2) provide an infrastructure to validate the 
project problem statement, operational concept and 
scenario, and 3) serve as a knowledge-generating tool giving 
insight toward the main task and the additional complexities 
and issues that would encompass a Maritime Homeland 
Defense (MHD) MIED scenario.   
 
2. THE M&S APPROACH 
 
 The M&S approach we chose to allow for a thorough 
examination of these system-of-system alternatives in an 
MIED scenario consists of four phases.  These phases are:  
 -Requirements: determine the purpose for conducting 
the simulation and identify the training audience 
 -Conceptual Design: scenario planning, constraints, 
player cells and overall design of experiments 
 -Model Implementation: translation of conceptual 
model into a computerized simulation and testing 
 -Experimentation and Revision: execution of the 
wargame and simulation for the purpose of understanding 
the behavior of alternative systems 
 
3. REQUIREMENTS  
 
As part of the SEDP, the project team required a method of 
testing the solution alternatives. Many of the solutions 
proposed were comprised of notional systems for which 
performance data was unknown or unavailable. Computer 
modeling and simulation became an attractive option for 
ascertaining data based on our best estimates input 
parameters, physical characteristics, etc.  Based on our 
systems engineering design efforts, the primary “MIED 
defeat” functions of Search, Detect and Neutralize became 
the focus of our M&S efforts.  A second area of emphasis 
was to gather insight on the important factors in reducing 
the effects of an MIED attack on the Maritime 
Transportation System.  A live exercise such as LEAD 
SHIELD exercise in the Port of Los Angeles was too costly 
and not well suited for the purposes of our study.  Therefore, 
the project team sought to design our own model and 
scenario to assist in our analysis of both the problem 
formulation and proposed solutions. 
 
4. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
 
4.1. Scenario  
 A fishing vessel has inconspicuously planted MIEDs in 
Elliot Bay in a planned attack against a passenger ferry that 
makes routine transits to a nearby island across Puget 
Sound.  The terrorist attack is successful and imposes over 
200 casualties when the ferry is struck.  A US Coast Guard 
first response unit becomes the next victim as it attempts to 
render aid.  Simultaneously, a cargo vessel that has been 
targeted is enroute to the loading docks in the Port of 
Tacoma.  As part the coordinated attack, as second terrorist 
cell towing a submerged kayak laden with explosives places 
the improvised bomb in the traffic separation lane directly in 
the path of the cargo vessel.  The cargo vessel is rendered 
immobile requiring an extensive ship salvage operation.  At 
this point an anonymous call is placed with persons 
claiming responsibility for the attack exacerbating the threat 
of additional mines in the area.  This portion of the wargame 
was not amendable and introduced the scenario to the 
response cell in a coherent sequence with the purpose of 
prompting the operational commander to secure port 
operations and force crisis mitigation actions.  Figures 1 and 
2 show the affected areas. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Commencement Bay 
 
4.2. Force Plan 
 The exercise controller coordinated the actions of 
the opposition forces and neutral forces in the wargame 
while the response cell was decomposed into the following 
elements:   
 -Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC): Operational 
commander/decision maker responsible for the actions of all 
supporting elements and assets. 
  Key Tasks: 
 Maintain C2 of the operation and 
coordinate the actions of supporting 
elements 
 Make the determination to implement 
Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels. 
 
 -Coast Guard: Lead element responsible for search and 
rescue (SAR) operations and emergency first response to a 
crisis in and around the harbor. 
Cargo Vessel
  Key Tasks: 
 Evacuation of ferry passengers to triage 
collection stations 
 Establish secure zone around the ferry, 
first response unit, and cargo vessel 
 Enforce MARSEC levels and make 
reports to JHOC 
Commencement 
Bay 
 -Navy Region Northwest (NRNW): Responsible for 
mine hunting and mine clearance operations in the Puget 
Sound area of operations (AO). 
 
        Figure 1 - Elliott Bay  
  Key Tasks: 
 Conduct area sweep of designated search 
areas. 
 Ordinance disposal of localized MIEDs. 
 Provide assistance during SAR operations. 
 
 -Local Authorities: Comprised of law enforcement, fire 
department, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and 
Seattle Port Authorities. 
  Key Tasks: 
 Setup triage collection stations 
 Account for all evacuated persons 
 Enforce secure zones 
 Firefighting 
 Ship Salvage Operations 
 
4.3. Wargame Constraints 
 The actions of the response cell were not entirely 
scripted but certain sequential activities needed to be 
completed within the specified constraints.  The first of 
these constraints was that once the attack took place and 
authorities were notified of additional mines in the harbor, 
response cell elements would not transit the bay until areas 
were cleared.  Therefore, SAR operations could only be 
accomplished using helicopters that would operate during 
daylight hours with a maximum capacity of two passengers 
per transit.  Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) could 
operate at any time.  All searches/neutralization actions had 
to be in accordance with Naval Mine Warfare doctrine and 
vehicle endurances needed to be adhered to.   
 
4.4. Design of Experiments 
 The first goal was to collect baseline data on current—
use systems measuring the search rate, probability of 
detection (Pd) and time required for neutralization of 
MIEDs.  Figure 3 shows a depiction of the current—use 
system.  This system alternative was comprised of REMUS 
100 UUVs and EOD teams to conduct the functions of 
Search/Detect/Classify/Identify/Neutralize. A secondary 
objective was to understand the determining factors that 
significantly affect re-opening a port once an MIED attack 
has occurred.  The closed-form simulations were intended to 
gather performance data on the proposed system alternatives 
that would later be used in a comparative analysis of 
alternatives with respect to the current—use system.  The 
data logger feature in JCATS allowed for replay of an 
executed scenario in which all actions from the simulation 
could be reviewed and analyzed. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Current—Use Baseline System 
5. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
5.1. From Concept to Executable Model 
 Model implementation involved building a virtual 
environment, dynamic moving objects and their behaviors, 
forces structures and constraints.  These features were built 
into the JCATS database known as VISTA.  Sensor, 
physical and mobility characteristics for most vehicles in the 
model were obtainable.  However; vehicles used by some 
proposed system alternatives were notional or classified 
posing an obvious limitation.  In such cases, best estimates 
based on open sources and legacy systems where used to fill 
the missing data.   
 Before creating a virtual map of Puget Sound in 
JCATS, field research was conducted to gather sufficient 
data about the terrain, port infrastructure, vessel traffic, 
military and civil authority locations.  Features that would 
be used in the model also included ferry routes, transit times 
to and from nearby islands, average number of passengers 
per transit and commercial and non-commercial vessel 
traffic that would act as background noise in the simulation. 
 
5.2. Building the VISTA Database 
 Each of the vehicles was constructed in the Systems 
Editor of the Vista.  The Systems Editor is used to build the 
basic attributes of an object, specifically the mobility type 
and the symbols used for classification and identification 
during the game.  In addition to the physical dimensions and 
passenger/cargo capacities, the Systems Editor allowed for 
design of detectability, vulnerability and survivability 
attributes.  For each element in the simulation, a pairing was 
established for how it would interact with other objects and 
the environment.  For example, a surface vessel could not 
detect submerged MIEDS, but had a vulnerability to them.  
Vulnerabilities were set using inherent PH/PK tables built 
into JCATS.  An element’s detectability was designed in a 
similar way with sensors contained by those objects. 
  
 Once the attributes for each object were set, they were 
aggregated by mobility class.  For example, surface vessels 
as mobility classes were vulnerable to MIEDs, with their 
physical dimensions dictating the various degrees of 
damage.  The sensor for each surface vessel was standard 
sight, called Direct View Optics (DVO).  The is sensor had 
a range of 0 to 2000m, 2 second scan interval and a 
horizontal field of view of 20 degrees.  Helicopters were 
also fitted with DVO and an enhanced range of 0 to 4000m, 
2 second scan interval and a 135 degree horizontal view 
based on a 300ft ceiling.  REMUS 100 UUVs were given an 
operating range from 0 to 50 meters and a 90 degree 
horizontal field of view, with continuous scan active sonar 
as their primary sensor.  The active sonar detection is a 
pairing algorithm that allows the database manager to enter 
the types of platforms that the sonar can detect and then uses 
JCATS probability tables based on user inputs.  Dismounted 
persons used “unaided eye” with a range from 0 to 1000m, 
20 degree horizontal view and continuous scan.  This 
process was repeated for the objects that comprised the SoS 
alternatives, many of which were classified systems. 
 
5.3. Force Lay-down 
 Location of each object and element group was 
determined from research conducted in Seattle, WA.  The 
neutral forces were randomly placed throughout Puget 
Sound.  The goal here was to re-enact a typical day in the 
Port of Seattle prior to the attack.  Asset placement also 
served as a venue for conducting functional tests of the 
objects used in the model.  The operational testing was 
conducted at the individual, force and game levels.  At the 
individual level each object was tested for functionality of 
behaviors programmed in VISTA.  Force level testing was 
done for the purpose of determining the efficacy of the 
elements and how well they worked together.  The final test 
was done to demonstrate all elements of the simulated 
wargame functioning together, a pre-trial of the free play 
portion of the game and insight on how the closed form 
simulation would be set up and executed.  Figure 4 shows 




Figure 4 - Initial Force Layout 
5.4. Preparing Player Cells for the Wargame 
 The project M&S team presented the scenario to US 
Coast Guard Sector Seattle, Contingency Plans and Force 
Readiness (CPFR) office.  The scenario captured the 
attention of key persons within the organization and an 
extensive table top exercise (TTX) followed in which the 
response actions of each agency was discussed.  The TTX 
was extremely useful in that it provided the M&S team with 
validated sequences and response actions to incorporate into 
the wargame.  The TTX included a discussion of the 
following:   
  -The use a Unified Command Center (UCC) from 
which to maintain command and control of crisis 
management actions and a list of participating agencies. 
  -Priority search and clearance areas 
  -Actions required to resume port activities 
  -Civilian authority integration with NRNW 
  -Sequence of actions 
  -Timeline requirements for each action 
The conclusion form meeting with CPFR was an 
understanding of each force’s roles and responsibilities, 
information crucial to executing an accurate, meaningful, 
interactive wargame.  CPFR added that the maritime rescue 
operation (MRO) and SAR operations added a high level of 
complexity to the scenario and would delay progress in 
hunting for MIEDs.   
 
6. WARGAME/SIMULATION EXECUTION 
 
6.1. Wargame 
 The wargame was executed over a period of two, eight 
hour days using a 2:1 ratio simulation speed.  On the first 
day, the first 6 hours were devoted to crisis management in 
which the response cell was prompted to take actions in 
controlling the scenario, conduct MRO using airlift 
evacuation and establishing cleared routes (Q-routes) for 
CG vessels.  The UCC established its priorities for 
overcoming the situation and conducted planning for MIED 
searches.  The first six hours (12 hours in simulation time) 
tested the ability of the command and control element to 
deal with the complexities of the scenario.  The JCATS 
program was ideal for supporting a “commander-in-the-
loop” simulation through the use of command and control 
(CAC) files.  CAC files are graphical overlays projected 
onto the JCATS map that provide situational awareness 
functionalities that focus on the human user.  Figure 5 




Figure 5 - JHOC Designated Search Areas 
 The second day of wargaming was devoted to 
conducting area searches and secondary crisis management 
actions.  The searches were accomplished using REMUS 
100 UUVs at a simulation speed of 15:1.  Objects detected 
by the REMUS vehicles were treated as new contacts based 
on the assumption that a harbor bottom-survey was 
completed within the last six months.  A total of 6 mines 
were placed in Elliot Bay, however; searches were 
conducted in all designated areas in Figure 4. Once the 
determination was made that an object was a MIED, an 
EOD team was mobilized to conduct neutralization, which 
required 2.5 hours (simulation time) for each MIED.  The 
detect-to-engage sequence used in the wargame did not 
account for the time required to conduct post mission 
analysis (PMA) of a suspected MIED or the set-up times for 
the REMUS vehicles and EOD teams.  
 
6.2. Wargame Results 
 The response cell was able to conduct an evacuation of 
all dead and injured personnel on the ferry within the 16 
hours of simulation time.  According to the TTX with 
CPFR, this would not have been possible due to the limited 
capacity of triage centers, difficulty involved with helicopter 
SAR and the likelihood of having to search for drowned 
victims.  This would have inevitably delayed the time in 
which MIED searches could begin other than establishing 
Q-routes.  In the wargame NRNW required only 30 minutes 
to deploy assets from Everett Naval Station to Seattle.  The 
realistic expectation would have included approximately 
two hours to arrive and three hours for the UUV platoon and 
EOD team to set-up at the insertion point. In addition the 
neutralization time for each mine would have exceeded 2.5 
hrs in a real MIED scenario because of the unconventional 
nature of MIEDs. The wargame did provide highly accurate 
results for area searches using the 15:1 ratio.  The three 
UUVs deployed simultaneously required 148 combined 
operating hours (simulation time) at a search rate of 460-550 
m^2/s with a 30 meter swath.  The baseline AFP also had a 
probability of detection (Pd) between 85%-95% and 2-3 
hours for neutralization.  This search time was relatively 
close to what was calculated using an exhaustive search 
model given the platform speed and sensor ranges.  The Pd 
was also reasonably within the parameters indicated by 
Hydroid Inc., manufactures of REMUS UUVs.  
 
6.3. Closed Form Simulations 
 Closed form simulations were conducted using the 
wargame template at the point in which area searches would 
begin.  Rather than running current—use systems, the 
simulations were conducted using objects from the Adaptive 
Force Packages (AFPs).  These assets were operated 
individually over the measured areas shown in Figure 5 in 
order to obtain detection probabilities and area search rates. 
The data collected from each SoS alternatives from the 
simulation was verified with same exhaustive search model.  
 
6.4. Closed-Form Simulation Results 
 Performance analysis was conducted using closed form 
simulations to determine the effectiveness of system 
alternatives in countering a MIED threat.  The performance 
data sought were area search rate, probability of detection, 
and time required to neutralize.  The various alternatives 
were evaluated and analyzed with reference to the current 
MCM system as the baseline model and threshold for the 
other alternatives.   Only some of the details of the proposed 
systems are addressed here.  See Rowden, et. al. 2008, for 
complete description of the proposed systems.  
 
6.4.1. Adaptive Force Package 1 
 The first closed form simulation was performed for 
AFP 1 which was an adaptation of the baseline system but 
included an enhanced sonar suite.  The key performance 
differences were an enhanced search rate of 630 m2/s, and 
higher Pd (88%).  AFP 1 still featured EOD divers for 
neutralization which on average required 2-3 hours for each 
MIED. 
 
6.4.2. Adaptive Force Package 2 
 AFP 2 consisted of the all elements in AFP 1, with 
exception of the EOD divers, but also included airborne (via 
helicopter) a laser mine detection system, a mine clearance 
system and a mine neutralization system.  With this 
upgrade, AFP 2 achieved a Pd of 95% and a significantly 
faster search rate (6650m2/s).  The neutralization times 
decreased to .5 hrs, since these systems are both aircraft 
deployed and remove the man from the minefield.  
Although these neutralization systems were extremely 
effective at neutralizing submerged threats and those near 
the surface, they required detonation of an MIED.  This 
could potentially pose significant damage to existing 
infrastructure.   
 
6.4.3. Adaptive Force Package 3 
 This alternative consisted of a multi-role underwater 
unmanned vehicle (UUV) capable of carrying search 
sensors and four single shot mine neutralizers.  The notional 
search sensor suite on the advanced UUV includes synthetic 
aperture array sonar with a Pd of 95%. 
  
 
6.4.4. Adaptive Force Package 4 
 This option featured the notional systems in AFP 3, but 
also uses a Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems 
(JAUS) that inter-links all of the autonomous systems.  A 
closed form simulation was not performed for this 
alternative and therefore shared the performance figures 
with AFP 3.  The added value of this option is that the 
search, detection and neutralization can be done 
autonomously using multiple vehicles vs. one multi-
purpose, but slow and expensive platform.  
 
7. MODEL RESULTS 
 
 The project team’s M&S efforts demonstrated that the 
functions of search, detect, classify, identify and neutralize 
are each necessary to counter MIEDs but not in the 
conventional sense.  These separate processes, require a 
variety of equipment, time and skills to be effective.  The 
grand challenge is to streamline these processes with the use 
of a single system or to increase the rate at which these 
processes are conducted.  The AFPs were designed with this  
 in mind due to the unavailability of traditional MCM ships.  
The wargame provided insight into the likely progression of 
events that would occur in an MIED scenario.  Planning for 
such an attack is crucial and priority search areas need to be 
built into contingency plans for an MIED attack.   
 The use of alternative systems to counter MIEDs and 
enhance port security requires the use of smaller, easily 
mobile, easily deployed systems vice conventional MCM 
ships.  The comparison of 4 AFPs in closed-form simulation 
showed that for presently available technologies and 
systems, AFP 2 is the most effective SoS to counter a MIED 
threat.  With its high resolution, probability of detection and 
speed of the MH-60 as the employment platform, 
Alternative 2 gives a much higher measure of effectiveness 
to Alternatives 1 and 3.  As a nominal option AFP 4 
provides equivalent search and detection performance as the 
ALMDs but offers the non-explosive neutralization method 
coupled with the capabilities offered by JAUS.  Table 1 
summarizes the performance comparison between the 
alternatives. 




 The use of wargaming in the campus-wide, integrated 
capstone projects had not been attempted by previous 
Systems Engineering Cohorts at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  The advantages of M&S in a System Engineering 
project involved taking two distinct processes and using 
them toward achieving the project team’s goal. M&S 
provided the ability to generate realistic measures making it 
a useful knowledge gathering and training tool in 
developing strategies and plans for Homeland Defense 
scenarios.  The wargame and closed form simulations 
supported the SEDP as tools for comparing system solution 
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